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Who is a 'foreign official" under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)?
This question will take on increasing importance in the coming years for two
reasons. First, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) are aggressively pursuing FCPA cases and, as a
consequence, testing the boundaries of the statute. Second, many foreign
governments appear to be returning to the old-time religion of state capitalism.
Foreign governments act as state capitalists not just through state-owned
enterprises, but also through public pension funds and sovereign wealth funds
(SWFs); these funds are perhaps the next frontier for FCPA enforcement.
Indeed, in 2011 the SEC put certain banks and private equity funds on notice
that the agency's enforcement staff had begun to take a closer look at the
banks' and funds' dealings with SWFs. This Article examines SWFs and other
state-controlled funds, including public pension funds, as "instrumentalities"
and their employees as 'foreign officials" under the FCPA. The Article
concludes that although in some cases SWF and state-pension-fund employees
would be 'foreign officials" for purposes of the FCPA, in most cases the
FCPA should not apply to these funds and their employees because there is no
link between the employees and the type of foreign policy concern that
motivated the creation of the FCPA.
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I. INTRODUCTION
From 2003 to 2005, Brian Travis and Nicholas Vulpis, employees of
investment adviser JLF Asset Management, were alleged to have solicited and
accepted bribes from David Baker, Daniel Schreiber, and Granite Financial
Group, LLC, brokers who sought to retain business from JLF.1 According to the
SEC, Travis and Vulpis received "international air travel (including for family
members), hotel arrangements, the cost of building a special crate to transport
Travis' Great Dane, fully-paid vacations, daily car service, computer
equipment, and monthly rent payments for a personal residence. Collectively,
* Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz College of
Law.
1 Litigation Release No. 20948, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 12, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20948.htm.
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Travis and Vulpis received at least $312,000 in such personal benefits." 2 In
exchange for these services, Vulpis and Travis directed trades to Granite
through Baker and Schreiber, and over the same period, Granite, Baker, and
Schreiber received trading commissions of $10,702,105. 3 The SEC highlighted
the material conflict of interest created by the bribery and noted that Travis and
Vulpis attempted to conceal the amount of trades directed through Granite, as
well as the amount of commissions paid to Granite.4
The SEC charged all of the parties with violations of antifraud statutes
under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
aiding and abetting JLF's violation of similar antifraud statutes under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 5
All of the parties-the bribers and the bribed-settled with the SEC.6 In
each case, the parties accepted the standard injunction against future violations
of the antifraud statutes they were alleged to have violated. 7 In addition, the
bribers Baker, Schreiber, and Granite were fined, respectively, $100,000,
$100,000, and $250,000.8 Travis, one of the bribed hedge-fund employees, was
required to disgorge $107,965, pay an equal amount as a penalty, and also pay
prejudgment interest of $35,029. 9 Vulpis, the other bribed employee, was
required to disgorge $105,450, pay a penalty of $100,000, and pay prejudgment
interest of $32,381.10
The Granite/JLF case involved the sort of act that falls within the reach of
the FCPA. The FCPA prohibits, in the words of DOJ, the
willful use of the mails or any means of instrumentality of interstate commerce
corruptly in furtherance of any offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization
of the payment of money or anything of value to any person, while knowing
that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given or
21d.
31Id.
4 1d.
51d.; see also Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); Investment Advisers Act of 1940
§ 206(1)-2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1)-(2) (2006). The SEC also charged the parties with a
violation of the SEC rule relating to § 10(b), Rule 10b-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
6 Litigation Release No. 21390, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Jan. 22, 2010),
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21390.htm; Litigation Release No. 21466, U.S.
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 29, 2010), www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/
lr21466.htm.
7 Litigation Release No. 21390, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Jan. 22, 2010),
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/r21390.htm; Litigation Release No. 21466, U.S.
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 29, 2010), www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/
lr21466.htm.
8 Litigation Release No. 21390, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Jan. 22, 2010),
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/1r21390.htm.
9 Litigation Release No. 21466, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 29, 2010),
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/1r21466.htm.
10 1d.
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promised, directly or indirectly, to a foreign official to influence the foreign
official in his or her official capacity, induce the foreign official to do or omit
to do an act in violation of his or her lawful duty, or to secure any improper
advantage in order to assist in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or
directing business to, any person.11
The only element missing in this case, of course, is the presence of a foreign
official. But suppose that JLF was a sovereign wealth fund or a national pension
fund: even though Travis and Vulpis might be compensated like private-fund
managers, and even if they do not consider themselves to be foreign officials (in
fact, they may not even be nationals of the state for whom the fund is managed),
under FCPA interpretations used by DOJ and the SEC, Travis and Vulpis would
very likely be deemed "foreign officials," and so Baker, Schreiber, and Granite
would be facing civil FCPA charges as well as criminal FCPA charges, in
addition to the charges that would normally accompany such allegations.
The application of the FCPA to state-controlled enterprises and foreign
funds raises a host of issues that are only just beginning to be addressed in the
growing literature on the FCPA. 12 This short Article, written as part of the Ohio
State Law Journal's symposium on the FCPA, attempts to sketch out some of
these issues.
First, it is unclear whether the FCPA can or should be read to cover foreign
funds. There are several practical reasons for arguing that it should not, among
them a recognition that most of these enterprises and funds operate as quasi-
independent entities that should not be viewed as direct agents of their
respective governments. These funds, especially, also typically serve economic
and financial purposes, rather than a political or governmental purpose.
Second, even if foreign enterprises and funds can be viewed as foreign
instrumentalities, it is not clear that the FCPA provides the best remedy for the
type of harm that the JLF/Granite case highlights. The SEC characterized the
harm committed by the JLF employees, Travis and Vulpis, as a breach of
fiduciary duty to the hedge-fund investors; the Granite employees, Baker and
Schreiber, facilitated this breach through their bribes. Cast in these terms, the
harm was an agency cost, and the SEC assisted the hedge-fund investors by
applying their enforcement resources to cover some of the costs of monitoring
the agents of the investors, Travis and Vulpis. If the hedge-fund investors are
the beneficiaries of this shifting of agency costs from private investors to public
enforcers, who are the beneficiaries of a similar shift when Baker and Schreiber
are viewed to have bribed foreign officials?
A third concern, related to the foregoing, is the apparent agency and judicial
drift away from the original purpose of the FCPA as a tool to prevent corruption
11 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Overview, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.
justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2012).
12 See, e.g., Court E. Golumbic & Jonathan P. Adams, The "Dominant Influence" Test:
The FCPA's "Instrumentality" and "Foreign Qfficial" Requirements and the Investment
Activity of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2011).
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that affects foreign policy. If this original purpose is to have any meaning in the
context of state-controlled enterprises and funds, there must be a link between
the foreign government, the instrumentality of the government, and the foreign
officials who work for the instrumentality. Each of these entities must be
connected like three links of a chain-the foreign government linked to the
instrumentality, and the instrumentality linked to the foreign official. In this
way, the acts of the foreign government have an effect on the foreign official,
and the acts of the foreign official have an effect on the government. Only if
there exists this linkage between the foreign official and the foreign
government-in the case of state-controlled enterprises and state-controlled
funds, through their respective links to an instrumentality-should we expect to
find the kind of foreign-policy effect that the FCPA was designed to police.
Current SEC and DOJ interpretations, as well as the scant jurisprudence that has
tested these interpretations, tend to look only at the connection between the
foreign government and the instrumentality. The legislative history of the
FCPA, however, suggests that because foreign-policy concerns are central to
the FCPA, the link between the instrumentality and the foreign official must
also be tested.
This Article attempts to get at the core issue of the proper scope of the
FCPA by considering who is an "instrumentality" and "foreign official" under
the statute. Additional clarity could be brought to this question by looking first
at the link between the foreign government and alleged instrumentality. Other
areas of the law, including foreign investment law, have developed a substantial
base of knowledge on the issues of foreign government control of state-
affiliated enterprises and funds that could help inform FCPA jurisprudence. As
noted above, however, the more significant problem concerns the
unidirectionality of current tests for "instrumentality" and "foreign official"
status. The tests used by the few courts addressing the issue have tended to look
only at the issue of governmental control, but have ignored the link between the
foreign official and the instrumentality-in other words, does the foreign
official exercise control over the instrumentality so that there is a meaningful
connection between the foreign government and the foreign official? This
analysis is key because if one takes the legislative history of the FCPA
seriously, an FCPA prosecution is predicated on the ability of the foreign
official to affect foreign policy.
In Part ii, I examine the FCPA's "foreign official" definition as applied to
sovereign wealth funds and other governmental funds like state pension funds.
The expansion of this definition is increasingly important as these funds play an
increasingly larger role in our capital markets. This is particularly true of
Chinese funds.
In Part III, I examine the criminalization of agency costs implicit in an
FCPA action involving bribery of an official or agent of a foreign fund. I will
also consider the problematic application of the FCPA to foreign
instrumentalities as investors-consider, for example, whether a private equity
fund could be considered the instrumentality of a foreign government if it
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manages a fund in which a sovereign wealth fund or a state-owned pension fund
is one of many investors. Part IV concludes.
II. THE FCPA's "FOREIGN OFFICIAL" DEFINITION
The FCPA has two main components. First, the FCPA put in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) a series of books-and-records provisions
that in essence require companies to maintain internal controls systems and
disclosure systems to make it harder to conceal (and attach penalties to the
concealment of) "slush funds" within a firm's financial statements. 13 Second,
the FCPA enacted anti-bribery provisions that prohibit both "domestic
concerns," such as U.S. citizens and U.S. businesses and their personnel, as well
as foreign persons in U.S. territory and foreign companies that have shares
listed on a U.S. stock exchange, or are otherwise reporting companies under the
Exchange Act, from corruptly paying, offering to pay, or authorizing payment
of anything of value to any foreign official for purposes of influencing any act
or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity, inducing such
foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of
such official, or securing any improper advantage ... in order to ... obtain[] or
retain[] business. 14
Unpacking all the definitions in the FCPA is a daunting task, not least
because DOJ and the SEC have added to the baggage through expansive
definitions of key terms, many of which are not challenged in court for reasons
amply explained by other scholars.15 The key term that is most central to this
Article's discussion is "foreign official." "Foreign official" is defined by the
statute as:
[A]ny officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any
person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or
department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public
international organization. 16
Key components of that definition-particularly "instrumentality"-are left
undefined by the statute. The Carson case involved payments by former officers
of Control Components Inc. to executives or other employees of state-owned
13 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2006).
141d. § 78dd-2(a).
15 See, e.g., Mike Koehler, The Faqade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 907,
917-18 (2010); Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 781, 812 25 (2011).
16 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(1)(A) (2006).
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enterprises. 17 The government argued that the state-owned enterprises were
"instrumentalities" within the meaning of the FCPA.1 8 In Professor Michael
Koehler's exhaustive review of the legislative history, prepared as expert
testimony in United States v. Carson, Professor Koehler stressed:
[T]here is no express statement or information in the FCPA's legislative
history to support the DOJ's expansive legal interpretation that alleged SOEs
are "instrumentalities" (or "departments" or "agencies") of a foreign
government and that employees of SOEs are therefore "foreign officials" under
the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions.
However, there are several statements, events, and information in the
FCPA's legislative history that demonstrate that Congress did not intend the
"foreign official" definition to include employees of SOEs. 19
Koehler also noted that foreign-policy concerns primarily animated the
FCPA's enactment;20 the implication of this observation is that a state-owned
enterprise is often likely to have at best only a tenuous connection to foreign
policy concerns.
By Koehler's count, the SEC and DOJ's untested, expansive definition of
foreign official in the context of state-controlled enterprises was at the core of
six out of nine FCPA cases brought in 2009,2 1 twelve out of twenty cases in
2010,22 and thirteen of sixteen cases in 2011.23 While it is clear that a foreign
finance minister would be considered a foreign official for purposes of the
FCPA, what about lower-ranking officials? And what if these officials serve not
as ministry employees, but as employees of a state-managed pension fund or a
sovereign wealth fund? In such cases, the DOJ and SEC appear to view these
funds as instrumentalities 24 of the government, and so each of their employees
17 United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. May 18, 2011).
'
81d. at *3.
19 Declaration of Professor Michael J. Koehler in Support of Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Counts One Through Ten of the Indictment at 4, United States v. Carson, No. SA
CR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011).2Old. at5.
21 Koehler, supra note 19, at 966.
22 Mike Koehler, The Akim of Nookat, Lots of Nigerian Customs Officials, the Congo
Merchant Marine, and Lots of Telecom Employees The "Foreign Officials" of 2010, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-akim-of-nookat-lots-of-
nigerian-customs-officials-the-congo-merchant-marine-and-lots-of-teecom-employees-the-
foreign-officials-of-2010.2 3 Mike Koehler, Healthcare Providers, Telecom (and Other SOE) Employees,
Veterinarians, and Liquor Store Employees The "Foreign Officials" of 2011, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/healthcare-providers-telecom-
and-other-soe-employees-veterinarians-and-liquor-store-employees-the-foreign-officials-of-
2011.
24 See Dionne Searcey & Randall Smith, SEC Probes Banks, Buyout Shops over
Dealings with Sovereign Funds, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/
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would be a foreign official under the FCPA.2 5 This follows from interpretative
guidance by DOJ that, although not directly on point, makes clear that foreign
funds would fall within the agencies' definition of an instrumentality.
Most of this guidance, like much of the case law that has challenged it,
considers whether an employee of a state-owned enterprise should be
considered a "foreign official." In a 1994 FCPA Opinion Procedure Release,
DOJ stated that it would treat as a foreign official an employee of a state-owned
enterprise even though the domestic concern dealing with the state-owned
enterprise had been advised that under the nation's law, "the [employee] would
not be regarded as either a government employee or a public official. '2 6 This
understanding was echoed in public comments by Peter Clark, Deputy Chief of
DOJ's Fraud Section, Criminal Division, who supervised FCPA enforcement.
Clark counseled that companies attempting to determine whether a
"government-owned commercial enterprise" was a foreign official under the
FCPA should focus on issues of control and influence. 27 Thus, not only is the
government's percentage of ownership or voting rights important in making the
determination, but also whether the entity's employees "hold governmental
roles, have the rights and privileges of government positions, or are capable of
exerting influence on the government."2 8
In one (and perhaps the only) instance, DOJ has indicated that the foreign
government's own estimation of whether a state-owned enterprise is an
instrumentality of the foreign government may be significant. In comments
SB 10001424052748704307404576080403625366100.html?mod-WSJEUROPE hpp sectio
ns markets.
25 In a recent Business Lawyer article, attorneys Joel M. Cohen, Michael P. Holland,
and Adam P. Wolf collect a sample of cases in which state-owned enterprises have been
classified as "instrumentalities," including: the Baker Hughes Information case in which,
according to DOJ, "Kazakhoil was controlled by officials of the Government of Kazakhstan"
and thereby was an "instrumentality" of the Kazakhstan government, making its employees
foreign officials under the FCPA; the DPC (Tianjin) Co. Ltd. case, in which DPC was
charged with FCPA violations for "making payments totaling approximately $1.6 million to
physicians and laboratory personnel employed by government-owned hospitals in China to
influence their decisions to purchase the company's products"; and also in the Alcatel case,
in which DOJ alleged that Alcaltel made "corrupt payments ... to officials of instituto
Costarrisence de Electricidad, Costa Rica's state-owned telecommunications authority." Joel
M. Cohen et al., Under the FCPA, Who Is a Foreign Official Anyway?, 63 Bus. LAW. 1243,
1250 n.26 (2008).26 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review, Op. Proc. Release No. 94-01 (Dep't of Justice
May 13, 1994), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/1994/9401.
pdf. Because the parties agreed to contractually mitigate the risk that the employee would
not influence government policy, DOJ determined that it would not pursue enforcement
against the domestic concern. See id.2 7 Cohen et al., supra note 25, at 1254 (citing Peter B. Clark, Deputy Chief, Fraud
Section, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement Before the American Bar
Association Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Feb. 21, 1997)).2 81d
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provided to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Working Group on Bribery, DOJ stated that:
[S]tate-owned business enterprises may, in appropriate circumstances, be
considered instrumentalities of a foreign government and their officers and
employees to be foreign officials. Among the factors that [DOJ] considers are
the foreign state's own characterisation of the enterprise and its employees,
i.e., whether it prohibits and prosecutes bribery of the enterprise's employees
as public corruption, the purpose of the enterprise, and the degree of control
exercised over the enterprise by the foreign government. 29
In their review of the foreign-official definition, attorneys Joel Cohen,
Michael Holland, and Adam Wolf argue that domestic firms would prefer a
definition based on the foreign government's own characterization to the more
malleable categorization of instrumentality through evidence of control or
influence:
This consideration might be helpful to companies subject to the FCPA because
they can reasonably inquire during the course of due diligence of a potential or
current customer how that customer's local regulators classify it (i.e., do they
view the customer as a public or private enterprise?). Unlike the arbitrary
determination of how much "control" a foreign government exercises over a
particular company, in many cases there will be a definite answer to this
question, as a company should be able to determine how it is characterized by
its local government. Moreover, a domestic regulator is better able to identify
its own "officials" or "instrumentalities" than the DOJ, SEC, or an entity
subject to the FCPA.30
It is prudent for domestic firms to read DOJ's OECD comments as
inclusive, not exclusive; a state-owned enterprise that might not satisfy the
control or influence standard could nonetheless be categorized as an
instrumentality, and its employees as public officials, if the foreign government
considers the business and its employees as such. DOJ or SEC is unlikely to
exclude a state-owned enterprise from the definition of instrumentality even if
the foreign government has not so categorized it. As Cohen, Holland, and Wolf
note, "[o]f course, the DOJ and SEC are not bound to adhere to the views of the
foreign government regarding whether one of its companies is an
'instrumentality' of that government, especially if the DOJ or SEC suspects that
the government is itself corrupt. '31
In more recent comments, DOJ has stressed the control and influence
factors as the primary triggers for instrumentality status. Mark Mendelsohn,
29 United States: Review of Implementation of the Convention and 1997
Recommendation, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 1, 6 (Apr. 1999), http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/50/2390377.pdf.
30 Cohen et al., supra note 25, at 1254-55.
3 11d. at 1255 n.50.
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recently the Deputy Chief of DOJ's Fraud Section and supervisor over FCPA
enforcement, stated in 2008 that DOJ considers "all employees of public
entities" to be "public officials," 32 and agreed with the assertion that for a
foreign firm to be considered an instrumentality, "certainly over fifty percent
[government ownership] is [sufficient], and I think there are certainly instances
under fifty percent where it may well be." 33 In 2009, Lanny Breuer, Assistant
Attorney General, gave a sense of the breadth of the government's view of
"instrumentality" and "foreign official" definitions when he opined to a
conference of pharmaceutical compliance professionals that:
Some [persons that would fall within the definition of "foreign official"] are
obvious, like health ministry and customs officials of other countries. But some
others may not be, such as the doctors, pharmacists, lab technicians and other
health professionals who are employed by state-owned facilities. Indeed, it is
entirely possible, under certain circumstances and in certain countries, that
nearly every aspect of the approval, manufacture, import, export, pricing, sale
and marketing of a drug product in a foreign country will involve a "foreign
official" within the meaning of the FCPA.34
The lack of certainty surrounding a control- or influence-based definition is
undoubtedly frustrating to practitioners and, more importantly, the companies
that they represent. Somewhat more certainty is found in many other areas of
law dealing with foreign entities, in part because these other areas have
definitional sections and interpretive materials that help guide firms' conduct.
Although Cohen, Holland, and Wolf note that the government deviates from
strict control- and influence-based standards in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act 35 and statutes dealing with criminal acts against foreign
3 2 1d at 1255; see also JOSEPH P. COVINGTON ET AL., JENNER & BLOCK, FCPA
ENFORCEMENT TRENDS 1 (Oct. 24, 2007), available at http://www.jenner.com/system/assets
/publications/ 1069/original/FCPAEnforcementTrends.pdf? 1314127199 ("For example,
Mendelsohn explained, DOJ construes the term 'Public Official' to include the employees of
public entities.").3 3 Cohen et al., supra note 25, at 1255.
34 Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prepared Keynote
Address to the Tenth Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory and Compliance Congress and Best
Practices Forum (Nov. 12, 2009), available at www.ehcca.com/presentations/pharma
congress] 0/breuer 2.pdf.
35 They note that under the FSIA, a "foreign state 'includes a political subdivision of a
foreign state or [an] agency or instrumentality of a foreign state"' and that "[a]n 'agency or
instrumentality' is defined as any entity that is (1) a separate legal person; (2) an organ or
political subdivision of the foreign state, or owned by the foreign state; and (3) neither a U.S.
citizen nor created under the laws of a third country." Cohen et al., supra note 25, at 1258
(quoting Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 §§ 2(a)-4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (b)
(2006)). Reviewing the legislative history, they further note that "[t]he House of
Representatives considered a 'separate legal person' to include a corporation that could sue,
contract, or hold property in its own name." Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6613 14). A corporation "would be considered an
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officials, other areas of the law, particularly those dealing with foreign
investment, utilize control and influence standards within the applicable statutes
and interpretive guidance.
An example of this is the Exon-Florio legislation, as recently amended by
the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA).36 Under
Exon-Florio, controlling investments by foreign entities, including SWFs, that
implicate national security issues are regulated through a voluntary filing and
review process coordinated through CFIUS. The CFIUS process governs "any
merger, acquisition, or takeover that is proposed.., by or with any foreign
person which could result in foreign control of any person engaged in interstate
commerce in the United States," 3 7 and focuses on investments that may have a
security impact on "critical infrastructure." 38 Under recently enacted regulations
from the Treasury Department, control is:
the power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, through the ownership
of a majority or a dominant minority of the total outstanding voting interest in
an entity, board representation, proxy voting, a special share, contractual
arrangements, formal or informal arrangements to act in concert, or other
means, to determine, direct, or decide important matters affecting an entity.3 9
The regulations then list decisions that demonstrate control, such as the sale
or encumbrance of assets, reorganizations or merger of the equity or debt,
selection of business ventures, entering into or terminating significant contracts,
altering policies for control of sensitive information, appointment or dismissal
of senior officers, appointing or dismissing persons with access to sensitive
information, and amending organizational documents. 40
Under the CFIUS process, parties to a covered transaction typically file a
voluntary notice, often even when it appears that the transaction does not
involve a controlling ownership. After notice is received, CFIUS undertakes a
thirty-day "National Security Review." 4 1 Following this review, CFIUS may
either allow the transaction to proceed, or may undertake a second, forty-five-
,agency or instrumentality' of its government only if a majority of its ownership interests
were owned by the foreign state or a political subdivision of that state." Id. (emphasis
added). They note that "companies that were merely 'government-controlled' were not
mentioned as falling within the FSIA's definition of 'agency or instrumentality."' Id.
36 This Article's discussion of the application of Exon-Florio is based on (and amplified
in) Paul Rose, Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in the Shadow of Regulation and Politics,
40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1207 (2009); see also Foreign Investment and National Security Act of
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170 (West 2012)).
37 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(3) (2006).
3 8 Id. § (6).
3 9 Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons,
31 C.F.R. § 800.204 (2008).
40 1d. § 800.204(a)(1) (10).
41 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1) (2006).
1078 [Vol. 73:5
STATE CAPITALISM AND THE FCPA
day "National Security Investigation." 42 Certain transactions, however,
automatically require the second-stage review, 43 including foreign government-
controlled transactions, which are defined as transactions in which an entity
controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government seeks to engage in
"any merger, acquisition, or takeover" which "could result in the control of any
person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States" that could affect
the national security of the United States. 44 An exception to this requirement is
a finding by senior CFIUS officials that, after review, the transaction will not
impair the national security of the United States. The Treasury has also put in
place regulations under which transactions resulting in a foreign person holding
ten percent or less of a U.S. interest will not be considered "covered
transactions," provided the acquisition is passive and does not bring with it the
incidents of control for the foreign investor, such as a seat on the board of
directors. 45
A number of industry-specific regulations also focus on control- and
influence-based standards in determining whether or not heightened regulation
is necessary. An example of this is the banking sector and the provisions
governing investment in the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA)4 6 and the
Change in Bank Control Act of 1978. 47 The BHCA requires an investor to
obtain approval from the Federal Reserve before acquiring a direct or indirect
interest in a U.S. bank or bank holding company if the investment exceeds
certain control thresholds. These thresholds include investments in which:
the company directly or indirectly or acting through one or more other persons
owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 per centum or more of any class of
voting securities of the bank or company; the company controls in any manner
the election of a majority of the directors or trustees of the bank or company;
or the [Federal Reserve] determines, after notice and opportunity for hearing,
that the company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over
the management or policies of the bank or company. 4 8
The third category of investment-situations in which the investor may
exercise a "controlling influence"-presents a concern similar to that faced by
companies dealing with the FCPA. Looking to either the BHCA or Exon-Florio
for guidance may be of little comfort, however, since the striking feature of
these regulations is the relatively low threshold for influence in terms of
ownership percentage. Speaking before the Senate Banking Committee on
42 1d. § 2170(b)(2).
4 3 1d.
44 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(3) (4) (2006). Id. § 2170(b)(2).
45 Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons,
31 C.F.R. § 800.302(b) (2008).
46 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006).
47 Change in Bank Control Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j) (2006).
48 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(A) (C) (2006).
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sovereign-wealth-fund investment in U.S. financial institutions, Federal Reserve
Board General Counsel Scott Alvarez stated that:
In determining whether an investor may exercise a controlling influence over
the management or policies of a U.S. banking organization and thereby trigger
formal review of the investment, the Board considers the size of the
investment, the involvement of the investor in the management of the banking
organization, any business relationships between the investor and the banking
organization, and a number of other relevant factors.
The Bank Holding Company Act itself presumes that an investor that
controls less than 5 percent of the voting shares of a banking organization does
not have a controlling influence over that organization, and based on its
experience, the Board generally has not found that a controlling influence
exists if the investment represents less than 10 percent of the organization's
voting shares. 4 9
As we review the case law that has resulted from challenges to the SEC and
DOJ's broad interpretation of "instrumentality" and "foreign official," it
becomes clear that a similar control/influence standard has begun to take hold in
some U.S. district courts. In United States v. Aguilar,50 a 2011 California
District Court case involving the alleged bribery of officials of the Mexican
Comisi6n Federal de Electricidad, 5 1 the court held that an "instrumentality"
may include government-controlled agencies or businesses in which:
" The entity provides a service to the citizens indeed, in many cases to all
the inhabitants-of the jurisdiction.
* The key officers and directors of the entity are, or are appointed by,
government officials.
* The entity is financed, at least in large measure, through governmental
appropriations or through revenues obtained as a result of government-
mandated taxes, licenses, fees or royalties, such as entrance fees to a
national park.
" The entity is vested with and exercises exclusive or controlling power to
administer its designated functions.
" The entity is widely perceived and understood to be performing official
(i.e., governmental) functions.52
4 9 Foreign Government Investment in the U.S Economy and Financial Sector: Joint
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and lnt 'l Monetary Policy, Trade, and Tech. and
the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Ins., and Gov 't Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm.
on Fin. Services, I 10th Cong. 13 (2008) (statement of Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).50 United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011).5 11d. at 1109.
52 1d at 1115.
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In the aforementioned 2011 Carson case, also decided by a California
Central District Court, the test for an "instrumentality" was similarly defined by
looking to:
* The foreign state's characterization of the entity and its employees;
" The foreign state's degree of control over the entity;
" The purpose of the entity's activities;
" The entity's obligations and privileges under the foreign state's law,
including whether the entity exercises exclusive or controlling power to
administer its designated functions;
* The circumstances surrounding the entity's creation; and
* The foreign state's extent of ownership of the entity, including the level of
financial support by the state (e.g., subsidies, special tax treatment, and
loans). 53
Another test for whether a state-controlled enterprise is an instrumentality is
found in the Esquenazi case,54 in which the jury was instructed that the factors
that may be considered in deciding whether a state-controlled enterprise is an
instrumentality include:
* whether it provides services to the citizens and inhabitants of [the state];
* whether its key officers and directors are government officials or are
appointed by government officials;
* the extent of [the government's] ownership of [the enterprise], including
whether the ... government owns a majority of [the enterprise's] shares or
provides financial support such as subsidies, special tax treatment, loans,
or revenue from government-mandated fees;
" [the enterprise's] obligations and privileges under [the state's] law,
including whether [the enterprise] exercises exclusive or controlling power
to administer its designated functions; and
" whether [the enterprise] is widely perceived and understood to be
performing official or governmental functions. 55
The court noted that the factors are
not exclusive, and no single factor will determine whether [the enterprise] is an
instrumentality of a foreign government. In addition, you do not need to find
53 Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Carson, No. 09-77 at 5 (C.D.
Cal. May 18, 2011), 2011 WL 5101701, at *3-4. In both Aguilar and Carson, the court
viewed these factors as a non-exclusive list. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115; Carson, 2011
WL 5101701, at *4. And in Carson the court also noted that "no single factor is dispositive."
Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *4.54 United States v. Esquenazi, 1:09-CR-21010, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143572 (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 5, 2011).5 5 Court's Final Instructions to the Jury at 24, United States v. Esquenazi, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 143572 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5,2011) (No. 09-21010-CR-MARTINEZ).
2012]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
that all the factors listed above weigh in favor of [the enterprise] being an
instrumentality in order to find that [the enterprise] is an instrumentality. 56
The striking problem with the control/influence tests as applied to the
FCPA is that they are top-down and unidirectional. The central focus of the
tests is whether the foreign government can control the policies of the
instrumentality. A top-down policy is clearly defensible in the context of
investment regulations, since the concern is that the state-controlled business
will serve as a political vehicle for the government owner. On the other hand,
the concern that animated the passage of the FCPA was not the top-down use of
instrumentalities, but rather the concern that an instrumentality could be used as
a bottom-up means of influencing a foreign government's policies. Thus, if the
legislative history is to have real meaning, instead of asking (or merely asking)
whether the government has influence over the instrumentality, the question
should be whether the person at the instrumentality who is receiving the bribe
has the ability to influence government policies. That may be the case with the
health-ministry official, for instance, but exceedingly unlikely to be the case
with the hospital worker.
To align the tests used by the courts with the legislative intent of the FCPA,
the question of whether an enterprise or fund is an instrumentality should be bi-
directional: the core consideration for the courts should be whether the foreign
official is somehow linked to governmental policy, such that a payment to the
governmental official will somehow affect the foreign policy decisions of either
the U.S. government or the foreign country. The definition of an instrumentality
is key because it provides a link between the foreign country and the foreign
official. If one is going to test the strength of the connection between the foreign
official and the foreign country, the link between the foreign country and the
instrumentality must be tested (and this is indeed the primary focus of the tests
employed by the district courts), and the link between the foreign official and
the instrumentality must also be tested. Only if both of these links are tested can
one show full respect to the basic concern for foreign-policy effects that
underlies the FCPA.
Making the FCPA test for foreign-official status bi-directional would not be
difficult. As noted by Michael Volkov, an experienced FCPA litigator, a ready
framework is already available:
... [W]hen it comes to state-owned-enterprises, when is it fair to treat
such an enterprise as a "government entity?"
This fundamental question can be answered by considering the purposes
of the FCPA, which was to prevent bribes or other improper payments which
ultimately undermine the integrity of the foreign government and competition
among businesses for government contracts or benefits. One does not need to
look very far to answer this question-corporate law has already addressed
these issues, and developed tools to evaluate whether or not a person, or group
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of people, exercise "control" over a company. That same inquiry can provide
judges a firm foundation to build case law in the FCPA area.
The danger of bribes to government officials is that such acts skew
decision-making contrary to the public interest. If the bribe recipient does not
have control or sufficient influence within the enterprise to skew that process,
then the government interest in the private company should not constitute an
"instrumentality thereof." Applying corporate principles of control to include
factors such as ownership percentages, voting rights, participation in day-to-
day management of the company, will provide the framework and the tools to
develop adequate guidelines in this area.57
To see the problems with a unidirectional approach to issues of control,
consider the effects and the beneficiaries of enforcement of current tests which
address one, but not both, of these links. If the test looks only to whether an
instrumentality is linked to the government, it does not address the issue of
whether a payment has any effect on foreign policy because it does not test
whether the bribed foreign official has any impact on foreign policy
considerations. It merely looks at whether an employee of the instrumentality is
receiving a payment that, in keeping with his or her fiduciary responsibilities,
he or she should not accept. To take one of the more egregious examples from
2011, do the purchasing decisions of a liquor-store employee of a state-owned
liquor store affect foreign policy? 58 In this case it may have been perfectly
sensible to conclude that the liquor stores were, in fact, state-owned enterprises,
but this shows how such a top-down approach can produce ridiculous results
without the limiting principle supplied by a bottom-up analysis of the impact of
the alleged foreign official on the instrumentality and the government. Do their
decisions impact foreign policy?
That Congress was in fact aware of the need for requiring a bottom-up
analysis is seen in the "ministerial or clerical" employees exemption under the
original definition of the "foreign official." Although this exception was broken
out as a stand-alone "facilitating payment" or "grease" exception, 59 Congress
signaled that the original foreign policy justifications for the FCPA were
undisturbed by the change:
The policy adopted by Congress in 1977 remains valid, in terms of both
U.S. law enforcement and foreign relations considerations. Any prohibition
under U.S. law against this type of petty corruption would be exceedingly
difficult to enforce, not only by U.S. prosecutors but by company officials
themselves. Thus while such payments should not be condoned, they may
appropriately be excluded from the reach of the FCPA. U.S. enforcement
57Michael Volkov, What Is an 'Instrumentality Thereof'? Let's Keep It Real, FCPA
BLOG (Mar. 9, 2011, 7:08 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/3/9/what-is-an-
instrumentality-thereof-lets-keep-it-real.html.
5 81n the Matter of Diageo plc, Exchange Act Release No. 64978, 2011 WL 3158087
(July 27, 2011).5 9 See Koehler, supra note 23.
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resources should be devoted to activities having much greater impact on
foreign policy. 60
When one strips away foreign-policy considerations from the test of
whether a state fund or state-controlled enterprise employee is a foreign official,
what is the result of the FCPA enforcement action? Or, to ask the question
differently, who benefits from the enforcement action? The direct beneficiaries
would be, in the case of state-controlled pension fund or sovereign wealth fund,
the foreign government and, by extension, its citizens. The foreign government
and its citizens receive whatever agency-cost savings that come from the
payment of millions of dollars to monitor the fund's employees, paid not by the
foreign government itself, but by U.S. taxpayers. In the case of state-controlled
enterprises, the agency costs are again borne by the U.S. taxpayer, and the
beneficiaries include not only the foreign government, but in many cases the
majority of the benefits flow (at least indirectly) to the shareholders that own
most of the stock in the enterprise. This perspective raises an important question
in those cases in which foreign policy is not at issue: Why are U.S. taxpayers
paying for enforcement that serves to reduce agency costs for foreign
governments, their citizens, and in some cases, the stockholders of partially
state-controlled enterprises, but has no effect on U.S. foreign policy
considerations?
III. STATE-CONTROLLED FUNDS AS INSTRUMENTALITIES
If top-down tests such as those articulated in the Carson, Aguilar, and
Esquenazi cases control questions of whether an employee is a foreign official,
how would state-owned funds fit in this framework? Looking at these funds'
function and the form that they typically take, one first notes that the funds
generally mimic private entity forms, such as private pension funds or
endowment funds. In the case of sovereign wealth funds and public pension
funds, the actual management of the funds is not handled directly through a
ministry of finance, but through a combination of specialist employees who are
hired as in-house fund managers and external managers that receive mandates
from the fund to invest a portion of the assets of the fund. In both of these cases,
the managers hired by the fund may not be (and often are not) nationals of the
sovereign state that owns the fund.
While the form of state-controlled funds is typically similar to privately
controlled funds, the purposes of the fund naturally relate to state policies.
Public pension funds serve a direct and relatively simple purpose: the provision
of future benefits to employees and/or citizens of the state. Sovereign wealth
funds are created for a variety of reasons. 6 1 Some SWFs, for example, have
60 H.R. REP. No. 100-40, at 76-77 (1987).
61 Some of the discussion in this section is based on Paul Rose, American Sovereign
Wealth (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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been created as a response to the so-called "Dutch Disease." Dutch Disease
refers to the phenomenon wherein resource exports lead to rising currency
appreciation, which in turn affects the relative pricing of manufactured goods
from the same country. As the currency appreciates, other products become less
competitive, resulting in a distortion to the economy including a reduction in
total exports. An SWF helps to protect against these effects by making use of
currency reserves, thereby reducing the relative value of the currency in order to
reduce negative effects on other exported products.
Sovereign wealth funds have also been explained as the policy
instrumentalities of state capitalism. As argued by Gilson and Milhaupt:
[S]ome major developing countries (China foremost among them) increasingly
reflect a form of state capitalism what we call the new mercantilism. In this
form, the country is the unit whose value is to be maximized, with a
corresponding increase in the role of the national government as a direct
participant in and coordinator of the effort.62
As a general matter, it may be difficult to extricate the political from the
economic when analyzing SWF creation and behavior. SWF and other state-
owned enterprise investments occur against a backdrop of political relations
between the SWF sponsor country and the target investment's home country,
and it should not be surprising that warm economics accompanies warm
politics. For example, Jiang describes a significant reduction in Chinese
investment in Canada from 2006 to 2009 as the newly elected conservative
government attempted a "cold politics, warm economics" approach to China,
with the result that "Canada lost ground in China on the economic and trade
fronts." 63 Ultimately, Canada's government realized that the policy was hurting
Canada much more than China, and "continued disengagement at the highest
level would only put Canada in a more disadvantageous position." 64 The
investments themselves may also be made for hybrid political-economic
purposes, of course: investments by Chinese enterprises and Chinese SWFs
form part of the "go-out" strategy of the central government to seek out and
secure reliable sources of energy and materials around the world in order to
meet domestic manufacturing and energy demands. 65
62Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate
Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New /Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1346
(2008).
6 3 WENRAN JIANG, CANADIAN INT'L COUNCIL, THE DRAGON RETURNS: CANADA IN
CHINA'S QUEST FOR ENERGY SECURITY, CHINA PAPERS No. 19, at 16 (2010), available at
http://www.opencanada.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/The-Dragon-Returns_-Canada-in-
ChinaE2%80%99s-Quest-for-Energy-Security-Wenran-Jiang 1 .pdf.641d.
65For additional analysis on this point, see generally Larry Catt Backer, Sovereign
Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-Owned
Enterprises and the Chinese Experience, 19 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (2010).
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SWFs also serve as a means for countries to protect against fluctuations in
revenue as demand and commodities prices change. As commodity prices
fluctuate, governments that are dependent on commodity sales for a portion of
their revenues may have difficulty in planning expenditures in the face of
revenue volatility. As Monk explains, "volatile commodity revenues have a
negative impact on the growth of resource-rich countries. Fluctuating revenues
make it extremely difficult to pursue a prudent fiscal policy, especially over the
long-term which, in turn, aggravates other problems in resource economies." 66
Used in this way, SWFs serve as a kind of self-renewing rainy-day fund that
may be drawn down to maintain domestic economic stability.
SWFs are also thought to be a mechanism for ensuring intergenerational
equity; this is particularly true of SWFs that are based on severance tax
revenues. Intergenerational equity may refer to an imperative to save present
capital in order to use it to satisfy future commitments, such as pension benefits,
or as an imperative to save it specifically for the benefit of future generations,
irrespective of commitments to present generations. Intergenerational equity can
also refer to a principle of distributive justice: the primary concern in this sense
of the term is that future generations should be able to enjoy the fruits of the
nation's resources just as present generations have. 67 Thus, a SWF is not saving
to (or merely to) provide a present generation with an acceptable standard of
retirement benefits, but that future generations should also benefit from the sale
of a finite store of resources taken from the land that they are to inherit.
Additionally, SWFs can be explained as a tool to preserve autonomy and
sovereignty. This function may occur first at the level of the citizenry of the
SWF sponsor state or, second, at the level of the elites that govern the SWF
sponsor state. 68
As one considers the uses of state-controlled pension funds-the provision
of benefits to citizens and government employees at some future date-and the
uses of sovereign wealth funds-as protection against "Dutch Disease"-they
may be seen as potential mercantilist policy instrumentalities. SWFs operate in
many different ways and may be used as part of broad economic policies (e.g.,
the SWF being used as a means to insure the supply of industrial inputs, such as
rare raw materials), for revenue-smoothing purposes, or to preserve the
66 Ashby H. B. Monk, Sovereignty in the Era of Global Capitalism 9 (Apr. 10, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (citations omitted) (citing RICHARD M. AUTY & RAYMOND F.
MIKESELL, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN MINERAL ECONOMIES (1998)), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1587327; see also Paul Stevens, Resource lmpact Curse or
Blessing?, 9 J. OF ENERGY LITERATURE 3, 13 (2003). See generally Raymond F Mikesell,
Explaining the Resource Curse, with Special Reference to Mineral-Exporting Countries, 23
RESOURCES POLICY 191 (1997); Kyle Hatton & Katharina Pistor, Maximizing Autonomy in
the Shadow of Great Powers: The Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 50
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (2011).6 7 Brett M. Frischmann, Some Thoughts on Shortsightedness and Intergenerational
Equity, 36 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 457, 459 60 (2005).6 8 Monk, supra note 67, at 23 24.
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autonomy of the state-sponsor or its political elites. To be sure, SWFs are often
simply used to profitably deploy otherwise inactive funds, but even though such
a use is primarily economic rather than political, one could still anticipate the
argument that any usage by the state is necessarily political, since the state still
retains ultimate (if not proximate) control over the assets 69 and ultimately
accepts or distributes the benefits flowing from the investment of the assets.
Thus, in these instances, one can plausibly argue that SWFs and public pension
funds are used to promote governmental policies, and thus qualify as
instrumentalities of foreign governments in the sense that they perform a service
on behalf of the government and its citizens. Furthermore, in some cases the
fund's officials are explicitly designated as foreign officials by the foreign
government. This is the case with China's SWF, the China Investment
Corporation (CIC):
CIC is viewed as a full ministerial enterprise. As a well-known practice and
part of the command and control economy's legacy, almost all the state or
collectively owned enterprises and their leaders are categorized into different
administrative levels like civil servants. They have been periodically scaled
and estimated by the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
(SASAC), and the Organization Department of the Communist Party of China
(CPC), in terms of administrative ranking, such as full-ministerial, deputy-
ministerial, and so on, according to the strategic importance and performance
of the enterprises in their charge. And the leaders' promotion and remuneration
are, in a large part, determined by the evaluation of these agencies.
... It is believed that CIC is a full ministerial-level enterprise, ranking
higher than common SOEs under the supervision of the central government
[State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission]. This is because
[CIC chairman] Lou is the former Vice-Secretary-General of the State Council,
a full ministerial-level position, and all the other directors are deputy-
ministerial cadres. Therefore, in terms of administrative ranks, CIC is a rare
enterprise controlled directly by the State Council and enjoys similar (if not the
same) political status as the [People's Bank of China], SASAC, Finance
Ministry, or Commercial Ministry. 70
On the other hand, while state funds may fulfill governmental functions,
they also tend to operate relatively autonomously. There are important
exceptions-CIC, for example, because of its tighter linkage to the central
government and its apparent use as part of the government's "go-out"
strategy-but even in these cases the funds are typically used in ways that
69 Although not typical, in some cases, such as with the Singaporean Temasek fund, the
fund itself is the legal owner of the assets. Li Hong, Depoliticization and Regulation of
Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Chinese Perspective, 1 ASIAN J. OF INT'L L. 403, 412 (2011). In
these cases, it may be easier to distinguish the fund from the central government and make it
perhaps less likely that the fund managers would be found to be foreign officials under the
FCPA.70 See id. at 410 11 (footnotes omitted).
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minimize their political effects. There are a number of reasons why a state
would insulate its SWF from political influence, and similar justifications also
apply to state-controlled pension funds. First and foremost, state fund
investments are routinely reviewed and regulated by host nations, especially in
cases where the state fund might obtain a controlling interest in the target
enterprise. To avoid the possibility of an investment being seen as politically
motivated (which may in turn engender a political response from the host state,
or at least increase the transaction costs associated with the investment), 7 1
SWFs often take non-controlling stakes when investing in U.S. enterprises, and
also avoid investing in sensitive industries. Furthermore, state funds will often
utilize various governance mechanisms to distance the fund investment decision
from political interference 72 and may also insulate investments by giving
investment power to outside managers. As a general matter, SWFs are
increasingly managed by sophisticated professional staff, not by government
bureaucrats. What seems clear is that to the extent that SWFs are linked to
governmental policies, influence flows downward from government officials to
the fund. Certainly, there are cases in which there is a clear link between the
government and the fund as an instrumentality. To take what is probably the
most egregious example, the Libyan SWF, the Libyan Arab African Investment
Company, was partly used as a means for Moammar Kaddafi to support other
autocratic regimes. 73
As summarized below, the top-down approach set out in existing tests for
whether a state-controlled enterprise or fund is an instrumentality of the foreign
government would result in the categorization of many SWFs and pension funds
as instrumentalities of the foreign government, and of their employees as
foreign officials.
[Tabular material on following page]
7 1 See Rose, supra note 36, at 1217.
72 Li Hong, supra note 70, at 411.
73Jason Mosley, Post-revolutionary Libyan investment in Africa, OXFORD SWF
PROJECT (Sept. 9, 2011), http://oxfordswfproject.com/2011/09/09/guest-post-post-
revolutionary-libyan-investment-in-africa/.
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Table 1: Aguilar Factors
Aguilar Factors Applicabilit to State Funds
The entity provides a service to the Yes
citizens of the jurisdiction.
The key officers and directors of
the entity are, or are appointed by, Yes (appointed)
government officials.
The entity is financed, at least in
large measure, through governmental
appropriations or through revenues Yes
obtained as a result of government-
mandated taxes, licenses, fees, or
royalties.
The entity is vested with and
exercises exclusive or controlling Yes, typically
power to administer its designated
functions.
The entity is widely perceived and Y although the functions are
understood to be performing official yes,ialthomic in ntre e
(i.e., governmental) functions. typically economic in nature.
Table 2: Carson Factors
Carson Factors Applicability to State Funds
The foreign state's characterization Often viewed as employees of the
of the entity and its employees fund (and may even be foreign
nationals), not as governmental
officials (with important exceptions,
such as the CIC)
The foreign state's degree of Varies, but many state funds run
control over the entity relatively autonomously (especially
with respect to non-economic
decisions)
The purpose of the entity's Generally economic in nature,
activities although the purposes vary from fund
to ,fund
The entity's obligations and
privileges under the foreign state's law,
including whether the entity exercises Yes, typically
exclusive or controlling power to
administer its designated functions
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Carson Factors Applicability to State Funds
The circumstances surrounding the Typically they are expressly
entity's creation created to serve particular economic
functions.
The foreign state's extent of
ownership of the entity, including the The funds are typically (and
level of financial support by the state entirely) drawn from severance taxes
(e.g., subsidies, special tax treatment, or currency reserves.
and loans)
Yet as noted earlier, even if we characterize many of these funds as
instrumentalities under these tests, the basic flaw in the tests is that they fail to
link the instrumentality's "foreign officials" with foreign policy. The
professional management of many (if not most) SWFs and state-controlled
pension funds typically obviates any link with foreign policy. Consider a typical
fund manager at a state-owned pension fund. How is he compensated? Often,
compensation is based on fund returns, which naturally lead the manager to
pursue value-maximizing transactions. What is the consequence of a failure to
achieve fund benchmarks? Ultimately, termination. To be sure, a fund manager
may take a bribe under the assumption that the transaction at issue will still
allow him or her to achieve fund benchmarks, or that the bribe more than offsets
the compensation increase he might have received had he selected a more
profitable transaction. Because fund managers are typically compensated based
on performance, however, there is at least some measure of protection against
value-decreasing corruption. Aside from this minor point, however, is the more
central question: what is the likelihood that a fund manager would be able to
affect foreign policy through his investment decisions? Suppose, for example,
that a U.S. asset management firm is competing for the business of a sovereign
wealth fund or public pension fund (external asset managers often receive
mandates to manage a portion of state fund assets). Does the payment of a bribe
by an employee of the firm to a state fund employee implicate foreign policy?
Perhaps in the case of the Libyan SWF, ties between U.S. financial firms and
Kaddafi's regime did in fact have an effect on U.S. foreign policy. Even in less
egregious cases, intelligent and skilled prosecutors could perhaps produce many
arguments for the proposition that the payment of any bribe by U.S. asset
managers affects foreign policy. Shouldn't we require them to make the
arguments?
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Article I argue that two "links" must be secure in order to find a
foreign official under the FCPA within the context of state capitalism. The first
is the link between the foreign government and the fund. The second is the link
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between the instrumentality and the foreign official, which, of course, connects
the foreign official back to the FCPA.
In the first instance, it is unclear whether the FCPA should be read to cover
sovereign wealth funds and state-controlled pension funds. As I have argued
above, many of these funds operate as quasi-independent entities that should not
be viewed as direct agents of their respective governments. That being said,
there are many cases in which it could reasonably be argued by prosecutors that
most state funds serve some government purpose. While many of these funds
are designed to serve economic goals, the line between political and economic
decisions is often blurred. Is using a sovereign wealth fund to help smooth
revenue fluctuations an economic purpose or a political purpose, if the
government knows that it must do so in order to have funds available in difficult
times to pay for basic public services? This is not to say, of course, that most of
these funds invest politically-that a particular investment is politically
motivated. Indeed, for the most part, SWFs and state-controlled pension funds
are passive, long-term investors.74 But I will concede that the reason for which
many funds were created, and the purposes they serve, could fairly be
characterized as having at least a hybrid political-economic motivation.
Even if we characterize many of these funds as instrumentalities under
these tests (which might be the case if one follows the tests set out in Carson
and Aguilar), the basic flaw in the tests is that they fail to link the
instrumentality's "foreign officials" with foreign policy. To see the problems
with a unidirectional approach to issues of control, I have attempted to show the
effects and the beneficiaries of enforcement of current tests which address one,
but not both, of these links. If the test looks only to whether an instrumentality
is linked to the government, it does not address the issue of whether a payment
has any effect on foreign policy because it does not test whether the bribed
foreign official has any impact on foreign policy considerations. It merely looks
at whether an employee of the instrumentality is receiving a payment that, in
keeping with his or her fiduciary responsibilities, he or she should not accept.
To take one of the more egregious examples from 2011, do the purchasing
decisions of a liquor store employee of a state-owned liquor store affect foreign
policy? In this case it may have been perfectly sensible to conclude that the
liquor stores were, in fact, state-owned enterprises, but this shows how such a
top-down approach can produce ridiculous results without the limiting principle
supplied by a bottom-up analysis of the impact of the alleged foreign official on
the instrumentality and the government. Do their decisions impact foreign
policy? It is this key consideration that has been missing in most discussions of
the foreign-official definition, and should be part of the courts' analysis if the
FCPA is to serve its intended purpose as a tool of foreign policy.
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